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Introduction
The issue of agricultural liberalization is among the most

contentious facing the WTO.

Beyond the implications for the

international trade regime, agriculture is representative of a modern debate
over globalization in which international forces encroach upon domestic
autonomy. A distinction forms that has the benefits of trade liberalization
opposed to the non-economic functions of agriculture support. Although
the issue of liberalization is readily divided, the distinction is problematic
because a resolution implicates both international and domestic concerns.
This paper advocates consumer choice as the means of reconciling
the conflict between international trade liberalization and domestic social
purpose. It is an attempt to form a theoretical framework that facilitates
the benefits of trade while preserving domestic autonomy.

First,

agricultural liberalization is necessary in order to minimize the extreme
costs of protectionism that are placed upon the consumer, the taxpayer,
and the foreigner producer alike. Second, the inefficiencies and trade
distortions that flow from protectionism are but misguided means to serve
legitimate ends. Democratic principle requires that domestic interests are
not excluded from international policy decisions.
The essential characteristic of a consumer choice model is that
decisions are made by individuals in the domestic market and not by states
in the international system. Trade promotion coupled with individual
choice, therefore, mandates an altered role for the state. Rather than using
outmoded mechanisms that obscure subsidies and externalize their effect,
states must adapt to globalization with options that promote informed
accountability. Globalization has greatly reduced the sovereignty of states
and has created an international marketplace. It is necessary for citizens to
become attuned to their increased responsibility. States need to develop a
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system in which traditional policy objectives may be satisfied in
nontraditional ways. It is a complex situation in which the individual selfinterest of the consumer must gain a social context. Consumers will need
to decide whether to assume the costs of achieving social objectives. Only
in this fashion will the fair functioning of open markets produce results
that are both transparent and democratic.

II. Agriculture and the GATT
Development of the GATT and Agricultural Trade
The tremendous growth of international trade in the post-WWII
period did not extend to all products equally, and the agricultural sector is
among the most notable exceptions to a general trend of trade growth.
“An analysis of the history of the GATT as it relates to agriculture would
conclude that this is an area in which the GATT has had ‘meagre
success.’”1 The failure to liberalize trade in agriculture should not be
viewed merely as an oversight of the insignificant, but rather as a
conscious exclusion of the controversial.
The contentiousness of agriculture is recognized by its prominent
place within the history of the GATT’s dispute settlement system, with
over 40 percent of all disputes involving agriculture.2 The relative
insulation of agriculture from trade liberalization is, therefore,
representative of concerted diplomatic design. It represents an
entrenchment of domestic policy protection into the international
framework for trade promotion.
The institutional preferences for agriculture are most clearly
viewed in the GATT provisions on quantitative restrictions, Article XI,

1

Joseph A. McMahon, Going Bananas? – Dispute Resolution in Agriculture, in DISPUTE
RESOLUTION IN THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION 128 (James Cameron and Karen
Campbell eds., 1998).
2
Id.
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and subsidies, Article XVI. Quantitative Restrictions: In addition to the
looser interpretative exceptions of Article XI (2) (a) and (b), which permit
prohibitions of a temporary nature and those necessary for meeting
domestic standards respectively, XI (2) (c) permits import restrictions on
any agricultural or fisheries product where necessary to enforce domestic
restrictions of similar or substitutable products.3 As initially constituted,
these provisions do not expressly establish a regime of domestic
protectionism, as there is the requirement of ensuring the maintenance of
foreign market share, theoretically indicating that “it should make
quantitative restrictions a rather unattractive instrument of agricultural
protection, since foreigners end up with a market share equal to that which
would exist in the absence of protection.”4 This theoretical constraint
found little translation into actual practice, however, as the major trading
powers consistently seek a broad interpretation of agricultural exceptions,
often straining if not threatening the entire trade regime.
Export Subsidies: The general prohibition on export subsidies is
subject to an exception for primary products, so long as “they not be
applied in a manner which results in that contracting party having more
than an equitable share of world export trade in that product,…”5 A
working definition of “equitable share of world export trade” proved
allusive and international trade distortions in agriculture continued at an
incredible pace. As with the interpretation of Article XI, so too were the
provisions of XVI broadly construed to the point of an almost carte
blanche exclusion of agriculture from GATT applicability.

3

MICHAEL J. TREBILCOCK & ROBERT HOWSE, THE REGULATION OF INTERNATIONAL
TRADE: POLITICAL ECONOMY AND LEGAL ORDER at 192 (Routledge 1995).
4
Id. at 193.
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The Agricultural Compromise
The exceptionalism afforded agricultural products can be seen as
containing both a normative movement and a degree of unresponsiveness
to institutional regulation. The GATT agreement was formed with a weak
normative commitment to the equal consideration of traded goods, to
which any subsequent attempts at strengthening resulted in the avoidance
of obligations. In the Pasta or Banana disputes for instance, the EU
collectively chose to block the adoption of panel decisions that found
GATT contrary subsidy and import restriction policies. Although these
disputes were eventually settled in negotiations with the US, it remains
that the EU was willing to face costly retributive tariffs for the sake of
fulfilling domestic policy objectives that took precedence over GATT
compliance. And far from unique, the examples of EU noncompliance are
but recent manifestations of a long pattern of agriculture protection that
has extended beyond satiating domestic interests and into the normative
foundation of the system of post-WWII multilateralism.
As early as 1955 a compromise was reached: “the US requested
and received a waiver under Article XXV largely exempted its domestic
farm programmes from GATT scrutiny. This waiver obtained by the
world’s largest and supposedly most liberal trader did serious damage to
the legitimacy and the functioning of the GATT.”6 A simple compromise:
the US was able to protect its agricultural producers; the GATT was
permitted to exist.
Embedded Liberalism and Agriculture
“Embedded liberalism” could be said to be the normative
compromise between the economic systems that had failed so terribly in

5
6

Id. at 194.
ROBERT WOLFE, FARM WARS 59 (Macmillan 1998).
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the first half of the Twentieth Century, “unlike the economic nationalism
of the 1930s, it would be multilateral in character; unlike the liberalism of
the gold standard and free trade, its multilateralism would be predicated on
domestic interventionism.”7 Embedded liberalism, therefore, reflects the
shared belief in the need to promote international stability through
transparency and predictability, while at the same time maintaining the
ability of states to pursue what John Ruggie terms “legitimate social
purpose”.8
The social embeddedness of trade is often overlooked, both in
elemental conceptions on the nature of economics and the more
rudimentary analysis of trade. Simply viewing agricultural products to be
analyzed in terms of comparative advantages and relative inefficiencies
obscures the extent to which agriculture has developed as a component of
social policy within developed countries.
That many developed nations have articulated agricultural policies
can be seen as a response to the diminishing role of the farmer and the
changing patterns of production; it is essentially a means of domestic
interventionism. When the majority of people are involved in farming, it
is hardly necessary to distinguish an agricultural policy from that of the
general economic policy of the national government. “States do not have
sectoral policies until the sector’s interest can be seen to diverge from
those of society as a whole.”9
The distinctly rural characteristic of agricultural production has
ensured that policy makers in developed nations afford it different

7

John Gerard Ruggie, International Regimes, Transactions, and Change: Embedded
Liberalism in the Postwar Economic Order, in STEPHEN D. KRASNER, INTERNATIONAL
REGIMES 209 (Cornell University Press 1983).
8
Id.
9
WOLFE, supra note 6, at 54.
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treatment, for unlike industrial producers that may support a city or region,
farmers approach something nearer to a definable “class”.
When there are more farmers than other people, today
generally in developing countries, agriculture tends to be
taxed; when the share of farmers in the population starts to
decline to trivial levels, as it has in OECD countries,
agriculture tends to be supported, usually with the stated
objective of maintaining farm income.10
Policy Misconceptions of Developed Nations
Representing the sustenance of rural communities, agricultural
support was viewed as a means of promoting the dual function of easing
the growing inequalities between rural and urban life as well as insulating
farmers from international market fluctuations. The special characteristics
of agriculture would, however, result in a form of application unique
within the embedded liberalism compromise.

“Unlike the rest of the

welfare state, however, farm policy provided indirect support to people
through the mechanisms of direct support for the prices received by
producers.”11 The indirect support given to agricultural producers was
dissimilar to other aspects of the welfare state as interventionism directly
impacted upon world markets, despite hopes otherwise. “The CAP, for
example, was based upon on two misguided assumptions, first that the EU
would remain a net importer of many farm products; and second, that
growth in the world market would contain the cost of CAP while
minimizing disruptions to world trade.”12 The effect was both increased
inefficiency for protected farmers and massive distortions for the world
economy.
Premised upon conceptions of the agricultural crises of the 1930s,
policies of many developed nations were unprepared for the changing
10
11

WOLFE, supra note 6, at 46.
WOLFE, supra note 6, at 55.
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dynamics of food production that led to the curious circumstance of
spiraling food surpluses emanating from comparatively inefficient
producers. Slow growth in food demand coupled with rapidly expanding
production ensured that domestic producers required increasing amounts
of aid to cover the decreasing value of overabundant foodstuffs. The cost
of subsidization strategies such as the EU’s mammoth Common
Agricultural Policy skyrocketed as distorted price realities supported
inefficient producers, and under the cover of protection the growing
efficiency gap, and thereby the costs continue until the system faces
collapse. Indeed, an OECD study suggests that multilateral trade reform
in agriculture could yield over $450 billion per year in net welfare gains.13
Clearly agricultural protectionism contains profound distortions that spiral
damage outward with increasing intensity.
The impact of agricultural subsidization upon the world market,
and specifically developing producers, was overlooked for far too long.
Agriculture support was not only premised upon misconceptions on the
nature of productive realities, it was also contemplated with a narrow
worldview.

International liberalism was envisioned as a multilateral

method for ordering economic growth and stability, but the conception of
“international” was decidedly limited, more accurately resembling the
developed western world. Ostensibly designed to facilitate trade in goods,
the GATT facilitated the trade of industrial goods while agricultural
products were insulated. While this may be evidence of the power influence arrangements in the post WWII period and their translation into
institutional preferences, this situation is simply untenable in a global
economy that has become completely “international”.
12

In 1955, the

WOLFE, supra note 6, at 77.
See JONATHAN COPPEL & MARTINE DURAND, TRENDS in MARKET OPENNESS,
ECONOMICS DEPARTMENT WORKS PAPERS NO. 221, at 6 (1999).

13
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continuing participation of the United States and the success of the GATT
depended upon agricultural preferences and exemptions.

Now, the

success of the GATT process depends upon agricultural trade concessions
and the equality of advantage.

III. Agriculture and the Uruguay Round
Progress – The Uruguay Round
The first major breakthrough toward reducing agricultural
protectionism occurred in the Uruguay Round of GATT negotiations with
the creation of Agreement on Agriculture and the numerous individual
commitments attached to the Marrakesh Protocol.14

Many significant

developments may be found in the Agreement on Agriculture, amongst the
most interesting is the categorization of domestic support methods into
conceptual “boxes” of acceptability. For instance, “Green Box” measures
are methods of domestic support that are not viewed as trade distorting
and therefore may continue indefinitely and are beyond GATT scrutiny.
“Amber Box” measures, however, are those that are conceived of as trade
distorting and must be phased out. For example, agricultural research or
training provided by the government is regarded as falling in the Green
Box category, whereas government buying-in at a guaranteed price
(market price support) counts as Amber Box. This classification program
has the obvious advantage of permitting governments a domestic function
while at the same time ensuring that the costs for it are not borne
externally.
In addition to addressing domestically distorting policies, the
Agricultural Agreement also contains significant provisions for reducing
the external barriers to trade. The measures, which limit market access,
14

See Marrakesh Protocol to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994,
available at http://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/13-mprot_e.htm (last visited
Mar. 17, 2005).
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are conditioned for removal by the creation of a tariff-only regime, or
“tariffication,” as non-tariff barriers are converted into regular tariffs and
duties, which may in turn be more readily removed.15 As seen throughout
the history of the GATT, the process of tariffication has the dual benefit of
increasing transparency as well as encouraging negotiated concessions;
with the costs of protection clearly visible, their negotiated reduction is
further facilitated. While tariffication has been a pattern for success, it
remains that states then must be willing to exchange the explicit added
costs for gains in other areas.

Substantial “non-economic” factors in

conjunction with domestic interest may make the transparent costs
acceptable or even defensible.
Gradual diplomatic negotiations eventually culminated in the
compromise that is the Agriculture Agreement, representing not the
assumption of one ideal by all but the conciliation of differing positions
around an acceptable core. While the Agricultural Agreement was a far
cry from the abolition of subsidies hoped for by the US and Cairns group
of countries, for the EU membership it was an undertaking of difficult and
reluctant concessions.16 The wide discrepancy of interest that surrounds
the issue of agricultural support cannot be resolved by trade diplomats
alone, it must gain the legitimacy of applicability from national
governments.
A Hollow Victory?
Evidence would suggest that the diplomatic success of the
Uruguay Round is limited to a framework for compromise as there is still
a significant lag in the normative maturation of this collectively assumed

15

See generally WTO documents on agricultural trade and market access, available at
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/agric_e/ag_intro02_access_e.htm (last visited Mar.
17, 2005).
16
WOLFE, supra note 6, at 96.
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undertaking. For instance, an OECD working paper from 1999 found the
past decade a bleak one for trade barrier reductions in agriculture:
While much progress has been achieved in lowering
protection on industrial goods, barriers to trade in
agriculture remain pervasive in most OECD countries.
Protection in the agricultural sector, as measured by
producer support estimates (PSEs), has remained broadly
constant at a very high in Japan at around 60 per cent and at
about 40 per cent in the European Union and 20 per cent in
the United States over the past decade.17
A more detailed examination of the OECD’s empirical data reveals
that in the five years following 1994 Canada and Australia alone had
declining agricultural protection while the major trading powers, Japan,
the EU and the United States, actually had increased levels of protection.18
Obviously, it is unrealistic to expect instantaneous transformations
resulting from trade negotiations, but the evidence of increasing protection
in the wake of a supposed agricultural breakthrough is perhaps an
alarming signal of the status quo.
Moreover, in the months preceding the Ministerial Conference
scheduled for November of 2001 in Dohan, there was explicit diplomatic
initiatives on the part of developing members to table the issue of
implementation regarding the Agricultural Agreement.

The proposed

issues of implementation were divided into three categories: 1) Export
Credits and Insurance; 2) Decision on Net Food-Importing Developing
Countries; and 3) Tariff Quotas. The broadness of the proposed issues
reveals the extent to which pervasive obstacles remain embedded within
the issue of agriculture. Although the issues raised appear technical in
nature, the underlying problem is fundamentally basic; a lack of normative
will. Cooperative structures certainly aid in the facilitation of stable and
17

Supra note 13, at 6.
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predictable state interaction, but for frameworks to produce institutional or
systemic change there must be the necessary political will.

So as

constructual agreements prove seemingly ineffectual at coalescing
reluctant powers like the EU, agriculture may well present a poignant
example of a paradigmatic shift.
New Pressures
As the international trade regime stands facing increased calls for
broader accountability, the paradigm of trade theory will be unresponsive
unless a more expansive conception of trade is developed. Beyond the
merely binary argument of whether trade is beneficial or not, and the
radicalized positions that view trade as an evil or protectionism as
irrational, a real attempt should be made to articulate which principles are
to guide the trade regime. Trade purely for the sake of trade will not be
sufficient to overcome the remaining obstacles.
As the words of the Director General of the WTO help illustrate,
“the WTO is not the GATT.”19 The route with which the GATT
progressed is not available to the WTO for the very success of the GATT
has meant an altered system. While the GATT has been successful in
promoting trade liberalization, each round of success ushered in a degree
of change that has left the WTO as an heir to both the gains and the
accumulated antagonism. A unique circumstance, success that is not an
absolute quality; the more that is attained the more contentious a matter
becomes. As the focal point of what the GATT was, and now as the most
obvious representation and institutionalization of the international trading
system, the WTO faces burdens that the previous manifestation could not
possibly have encountered.
18

See id. at 20 (Figure 1).
General Mike Moore, Keynote Address at the Partnership Summit 2000 (Jan. 10,
2000), available at http://www.wto.org/english/news_e/spmm_e/spmm21_e.htm.

19
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The minimalist basis that has been prevalent within trade theory,
namely the notion of individuals as rationalistic and maximizing actors, is
particularly well suited to a jurisprudence of diplomacy. Namely a process
in which basic rationalism and game theory models are all that is
necessary for explanation and justification. However, as more diverse
social actors claim access, and as the WTO creates legal jurisprudence, it
becomes evident that a rational model based on self-interest alone is
inadequate as precept of trade growth.

Legalism, even without the

legitimacy afforded by sovereignty, imputes a measure of authority, an
authority derived from constituting principles. And so as the trade regime
receives increasing international attention from diverse social actors, the
focus must no longer lie solely with trade wonks and instead extend to
trade as a socially constituted practice.
Certainly the social component of trade shall be invoked if the next
round of multilateral negotiations is in fact, as the Director General of the
WTO suggests, a development round. Apart from the attention paid to
clamoring NGOs, it is clear that before any further developments of the
WTO can be contemplated a reconciliation of the present regime is
required. Towards reconciling the systemic inequalities and developed
world preferences, the controversy over agriculture demand a resolution.
The debate contains a highly symbolic element, putting the changing
dynamics of the trade regime into full relief. With the economic costs of
subsidization now bordering on the impossible, the EU shall certainly
have to compromise; the question will be how the political costs are to be
minimized. Agriculture has captured the imagination to such an extent
that there will be considerable political consequence to simply
surrendering this sector. The previous practice of severing support to an
inefficient industry and weathering the localized political storm is
untenable in these circumstances.
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With non-economic factors potentially impacting across entire
societies, policymakers require a more comprehensive response than the
binary framework of whether “to liberalize or not to liberalize?” Initiative
should be shown in extending the paradigm of trade to include an adaptive
social setting in which the role of governments is to illustrate policy
concerns and the linkages to personal consumption. A government may
have a goal of furthering the educational standing of its citizenry, but that
this aim would be realized through excluding highly educated foreign
nationals sounds preposterous. Few governments need actively coerce
individuals into higher education; rather societal influences ensure that
there is such a demand if not the means. With governments maintaining a
developmental role it may help ensure that the benefits of trade, and the
strengthening of the trade regime, may occur alongside of domestic goals
and individual involvement.
A New Paradigm?
The GATT has been brilliantly successful at a simple task; a
system of contractual agreements that allowed diffuse benefit through
exchange concessions that parties had been previously unwilling to
concede. The trade regime acted as an instrument by which states could
temporize inefficient sectors of the economy, using a far distant
international agreement as a means to reorder domestic interests.

A

decidedly pluralistic model; competing sectoral interests are effectively
traded to exploit comparative advantages and sever inefficient producers.
This romantic notion may well be at an end. The attributes of the GATT,
which have been so conducive to diplomatic tradeoffs, namely its
flexibility and obscurity, have ended with the appearance of the WTO and
its centrality within invigorated international attention.

Appearing

concurrently with the rising publicity centering upon the WTO has been
the issue of agriculture after its long enforced slumber, changing the
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dynamics of trade negotiations and perhaps creating an impasse for
efficiency that has not been seen before. Beyond conceptions of the
sectoral interests of pluralism, agriculture presents a situation of extensive
domestic interest that essentially demands a more cognitive approach than
traditional trade theory provides.
Countries with large agricultural support programs have often
claimed that the vast sums spent are not the simply the waste of
inefficiency but are instead manifested in other essentially non-economic
forms. Trade critics have often view with derision the claims of noneconomic objectives, as the title of Professor Alan Winter’s OECD
working paper is indicative of, “The So-Called ‘Non-Economic’
Objectives of Agricultural Support.”20 Viewing non-economic purposes in
a so-called objective manner, Winters attempts a quantification of the
unquantifiable. In an interesting paper, Winters details the ways in which
stated policy objectives are misdirected through agricultural support in
such as areas maintaining farm income, preserving rural communities,
environmental and pollution concerns.
Detailing each objective, Winters then analyzes the economic
merits of each and invariably reaches the conclusion that direct support
would be preferable to the indirect subsidization method. For instance,
Winter suggests that maintaining farm income would be best served by
direct income support, “While these are real problems, they do not seem
sufficiently serious to rule direct income support of the set of acceptable
policies.”21 That direct income support is basically social assistance is not
addressed, and it is unclear upon what basis farmers would continue in

20

L. ALAN WINTERS, THE SO-CALLED “NON-ECONOMIC” ObJECTIVES OF
AGRICULTURAL SUPPORT, OECD ECONOMIC STUDIES NO. 13 (1989-1990), available
at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/0/43/34318482.pdf.
21
Id. at 247.

Vol. 3 [2005]

LIBERALIZATION OF AGRICULTURAL TRADE
Michael Ilg

16

their rural function if given government incentives that have no
geographical tie and contain an implicit pressure to retrain.
Arguably the most unquantifiable objective of agricultural support
is that of the value of landscape or what Winters terms amenity. Winters
again uses a specific analyses to find misdirected funds, “results suggest
serious problems of consistency when, for example, the U.K. central
government provides direct support of £73.4 million for the Royal Parks,
countryside and nature preservation, and £2,342 million for agriculture,
fishing and forestry.”22 But is this really a conflict of consistency or
simply a matter of overlap? Does agriculture not sustain the countryside
in a manner consistent with the aims of the British government?
Conducting a sectoral economic study which details the manner in
which each non-economic objective may be accomplished in a cheaper
way begs the question of whether it may achieve all the stated objectives
at once. How does one quantify the cost of supporting the incomes of
rural communities and the cost of maintaining rural landscapes when both
of which are predicated on the existence of the farmer? Assumptions on
the cost of non-economic factors such as the maintenance of the rural
landscape cannot be calculated in the same model that also advocates
direct income support for farmers, as it eliminates farmers and inevitably
alters the landscape regardless of current expenditures.
The objectives of agricultural support are not simply policy
proposals, they are the stated defense of conditions as they currently exist;
they may be achieved at less cost in theoretical models, but would they
exist in reality without the basic support of agriculture? The question
remains that if funds now allocated to supporting farmers are redistributed
in a more economical and direct fashion to meet myriad non-economic
22

Id. at 255.
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objectives, would these objectives even be met in the absence of the
farmer?

IV.

A New Role for the State
Globalization

So much has been made of the phenomenon of globalization that it
would redundant to produce an in depth analysis here. Instead it will
suffice to acknowledge that there has been a fundamental change in the
ways in which actors communicate and business is conducted.

The

essential point is that the power of the state to regulate its domestic
economy has been reduced. The various manifestations all have had a
hand in the general process of lessening state power, including the
instantaneous spread of information, electronic funds transfers, and
increased capital mobility. Against the backdrop of this altered landscape,
schemes such as the EU’s CAP are a remnant from a simpler time. The
costs of this inefficient holdover can no longer be borne by domestic
consumers and taxpayers, and it will no longer be tolerated by developing
countries that will demand concessions before any further trade
negotiations proceed. That is, agricultural subsidization is a remnant that
may no longer be conciliated domestically or internationally.
WTO Compliance
The most obvious avenue for easing the effects of liberalization
may be found in the “Green Box” category of the Agreement on
Agriculture. Spending initiatives that fall into this category have the dual
benefit of permitting agricultural spending while remaining WTO
compliant.

Any number of policies that support agriculture may be

contemplated so long as they are direct payments and not the indirect price
supports that are trade distorting. For instance, direct social spending for
agricultural research would be WTO compliant while conceivably
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Admittedly, this is not a

complete solution and the larger problem remains of how to support
farmers without unfair subsidies. Direct welfare to families that continue
to farm would only be a shift of support, and subsidization would continue
to distort price realities. Thus, the cost must be borne in the market and in
the prices paid.
Coordinating Civil Society
Globalization has not ended an era of domestic autonomy but
simply shifted its focus.

Governments may still foster autonomous

domestic policy by educating the public on the consequences of
agriculture, and indeed all, consumption.

A report from the EU’s

Committee of the Regions entitled Opinion on the Common agricultural
policy and the conservation of Europe’s cultural landscape23 illustrates
the extent to which policymakers’ perception of agricultural policy as a
mechanism of price support has broadened to include the diverse linkages
of agriculture. These non-trade benefits of agriculture, such as sustaining
rural communities, protecting the environment, rural landscapes and
tourism, should also be the responsibility of individuals.
Governments need to coordinate public awareness with regulatory
schemes that facilitate the articulation of domestic opinion. Information
campaigns and political debate could easily inform citizens of the
consequences upon the non-trade objectives mentioned above. Citizens
must know that simply buying the cheapest product will come at the
expense of promoting certain political issues. Therefore, regulation will
be required to differentiate between not only products, but also political
23

The Committee of the Regions, Opinion of the Committee of the Regions of 14 June
2000 on the Common agricultural policy and the conservation of Europe’s cultural
landscape, available at
http://coropinions.cor.eu.int/CORopinionDocument.aspx?identifier=cdr\commission2\do
ssiers\com2-013\cdr285-1999_fin_ac.doc&language=EN (last visited Mar. 17, 2005).
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issues. Of the many possibilities for regulatory differentiation, four appear
especially salient; environmental, health and safety, geography, and brand
name.
Both environmental and health labeling would entail distinguishing
between products based upon whether they conform to EU standards of
agricultural production. Although foreign products are not necessarily
distinguished, consumers would receive the benefit of knowing whether a
foodstuff is produced with a minimum of environmental degradation or
genetic modification.

While WTO rules may not permit excluding a

product, consumers should be informed of the practices that European
governments do not support.

For instance, if cattle are raised in an

environmentally harmful manner or are injected with various hormones
the consumer should have the right to make an informed decision.
The second group of labeling options is explicitly based upon
location. First, a form of geographic labeling could distinguish which
products are produced locally. This serves the dual aim of helping support
local farmers and ensuring freshness. The second geographic labeling
measure, brand name, is much more complex.

It advocates treating

agricultural products as other goods and protecting the usage of renowned
names. For example, French Rochefort cheese or Italian Parma Ham
would not be universal food types but specific labels for food actually
produced in that region24.

As Europe possesses a highly regarded

agricultural tradition, especially in such areas as wine, cheese, or pasta,
this presents an opportunity to develop Europe’s comparative advantage in
agriculture. But agriculture as source of brand names is problematic, for
unlike the previous options that promote information, protecting

24

EU Trade Directorate, at http://www.europa.org (last visited Mar. 17, 2005).
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agricultural names is restrictive and has international implications beyond
the scope of this paper.
The options given a thumbnail sketch above are not meant as
concrete policy proposals but rather conceptual examples that indicate the
role of information. It is easy to be cynical of the ability of individuals to
overcome self-interest, but the issue is much more elemental than daily
choices in which consumers will have to pay more for the collective good.
Public opinion may form collective conceptions that become accepted and
then form part of the collective consciousness. Consider the declining
incidence of cigarette addiction in countries that have articulated strong
anti-smoking campaigns, where information on the health risks associated
with smoking gradually moves it to the periphery of social acceptance. It
is not inconceivable that articulated public opinion might extend from
health to environmental or human rights issues. For example, warning
labels on Nike shoeboxes which alert the consumer to the use of child
labour could do much toward furthering social concerns.

V.

Conclusion
Francis Fukuyama’s The End of History and the Last Man was

received with much attention in the early 1990s. Fukuyama’s belief in
liberalism as the final epoch of human development coincided nicely with
congratulatory sentiments that were prevalent with the end of the cold war.
Basically an affirmation of the Hegelian dialectic, The End of History
argues that liberalism of the 18th Century remains the pinnacle of
philosophical development. Fukuyama reminds us that liberalism is a
stable paradigm of thought that traces back to John Locke and Adam
Smith, equally embracing liberty and the “invisible hand of the market”.
But as state power is redefined in the process of globalization, the concept
of individuals left under the invisible hand will have to be rethought.
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It is useful to remember that the post WWII compromise of
embedded liberalism was premised on both economic liberalism and
legitimate social purpose. Globalization has reduced the functioning of
the state and removed the main instrument of protecting this legitimate
social purpose.

The economic effects upon individuals are beyond

contact, and beyond accountability as the political is subsumed into the
international economic marketplace. What it is occurring is not the simple
extension of issues into the international arena, but the elimination of a
level of political accountability.

Individuals may no longer have a

political voice in economic issues that affect their society.

Only the

market remains, and “a market is not necessarily democratic.”25
If only the “invisible hand of the market” is left to order society,
then absent will be fundamental democratic ideals. As the Canadian
political scientist C.B. Macpherson commented, “We may still call it
consumer sovereignty if we wish. But the sovereignty of an aggregate of
such unequal consumers is not evidently democratic.”26 The state must
make the market a place where ideals have force. Required is a system of
informed and nuanced consumer choice in which the state articulates
objectives that a majority of citizens support.

A form of nuanced

consumption in which the costs support domestic concerns in the face of
international trade hegemony. If traditional institutions have less force in
the articulation of democratic agendas, then democratic expression
requires alternative forums. In the end, the market must be made more
accountable.

25

C.B. MACPHERSON, ThE LIFE AND TIMES OF LIBERAL DEMOCRACY 86 (Oxford
University Press 1977).
26
Id. at 87.

